
There is a lasting perception of the ocean as an endless resource, a vast expanse that is fundamentally asocial. As Philip Steinberg writes, the ocean is imagined as “a space ‘outside’ society...an abstract point on a grid, to be developed” (Steinberg, 2001, p. 207). However, covering almost three quarters of the planet’s surface, ocean space has always played and important role in societies for sustenance, livelihoods, commerce, and culture. The fact that almost half the world’s population lives within 200 km of the coast demonstrates our extensive connection to the sea (Cohen, 1997). The world’s ocean faces dire threats, including rising acidity, oil, nitrate and phosphate pollution, as well as the everyday human trash that finds its way to even the most remote marine regions. As a voluminous medium of constant movement and change, the ocean is a difficult place to govern or regulate. These physical properties complicate questions of management, responsibility, resource allocation, sovereignty, and security.

One way of wrestling with these complex issues is by examining how they play out in subnational (or non-sovereign) island jurisdictions (SNIJs): a category of analysis suggested by Godfrey Baldacchino in his timely 2010 book, Island Enclaves. By reviewing mainland/big state-island/small state relations as they affect SNIJs, Baldacchino examines a broad range of strategies and technologies of creative governance that have taken offshoring to new heights in the 21st century.

One policy domain where such novel manifestations of sovereignty are crafted and expressed is that of ocean governance. As small island states know only too well, ocean space still comprehends contested legal regimes, with their oddly striated jurisdictions, extending progressively offshore: Territorial Waters, the Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zones, extended Continental Shelves, and ending in the High Seas or international waters. Each of these jurisdictions establishes a gradient of ownership and liability. As a contested and peripheral region, it is a sought after space for economic development and, as Baldacchino writes, “contestable, border regions – such as the ocean depths [and including] outer space, and increasingly the Arctic, are treated as fair game for mainland subjugation and organization” (p. 35). And like Baldacchino’s islands, ocean spaces also represent exemplars of ‘fractal sovereignty,’ ‘ambiguous zones’ and ‘non-spaces’ …“locations that are [seen as] devoid of identity, [of] organically arisen relationships and history” (p. 26).

The legal construction of the ocean stems from the 1982 United Nations Conference on the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS III). The resulting heterogeneous jurisdictional spaces are an attempt to strike a balance between full state enclosure of the ocean and a need to preserve freedoms of navigation so important for shipping routes and global trade. These dual functions serve capital well in this legal framework, with the ocean serving as both a horizontal surface of transport and a vertical exploitable resource. They are, however, not without contradictions that manifest in ocean governance, geopolitical tensions, and environmental impacts. As Steinberg (1999) describes it, ocean space is “a domain that is resistant to direct state surveillance and territoriality but that nonetheless has been incorporated within statist discourse...[and these] contradictory tendencies in modern-era marine governance...may be viewed as reflecting the ebb and flow of contradictory tendencies in the spatiality of capitalism” (p. 254).

Of course, the spatial articulation of capitalism has been limited by the physical properties of the ocean, retarding its complete reconfiguration of the seascape, as it has done to many landscapes, as Harvey (1985) puts it, in striving “to create a physical landscape in its own image and requisite
to its own needs at a particular point in time” (p. 150). But neither the ocean’s resources nor pollutants hesitate to spill over any politically, legally or socially constructed boundaries. Efforts to territorialize the sea simply further extend the terrestrial boundaries of coastal nations, imposing fixed grids on this seething expanse; yet managing the ocean as a static space has failed to capture its materiality and led to ambiguity regarding sovereignty, security, management and responsibility. One alarming outcome of this has been transboundary environmental degradation in the form of trash gyres: diffuse collections of garbage that gather under a migrating atmospheric high-pressure area in open waters. The complexity and scale of this environmental problem makes it extremely challenging. Five large trash gyres have been ‘discovered’ in the North and South Pacific, North and South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. The North Pacific trash gyre is thought to be the largest.

While most ocean pollution originates on land, this waste once at sea, becomes ephemeral and fragmented, allowing it to evade quantification and resist the Cartesian spatialities imposed upon it. Despite these, the North Pacific trash gyre has been widely represented in the media through a terrestrial imaginary, adopting such categories as solid, visible, stationary – even described as “an island twice the size of Texas” (Hoshaw, 2009). These constructions of the sea, as sharing properties of the terrestrial, are incongruent with the physicality of ocean space. These portrayals paint a much different picture than the diffuse and pervasive detritus, constantly in motion. In actuality, this gyre phenomenon shares the properties of its medium, something that flows, penetrating to unknown depths, resistant to tracking or collection, incompatible with these island-like notions. Like Harvey’s description of an assemblage, the gyre embodies “ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic” (Harvey, 1991, p. 44).

The resources of the high seas are the common property of all countries, and the largest convergence zone for the North Pacific trash gyre inhabits international waters. But still, its seasonal circulation and interactions with different currents does bring it into the purview of many other jurisdictions, and particularly small island developing states like Fiji, Kiribati and Samoa. The gyre also migrates seasonally, crossing these boundaries with prevailing winds. This drifting clearly complicates matters of responsibility, occupying regions that are treated as extraterritorial or non-space. “Moreover, being on the edge, out of sight and so often out of mind”, as Baldacchino writes: “paradigms tend to be weakest at their peripheries; challenges to sovereignty [are] most apparent at the margin, where power is more clearly contested” (p. 14).

Despite the evident land / sea binary, the juridical enclaves of the islands discussed in Baldacchino’s book seem to share many commonalities with spaces of ocean governance, such as a ‘fuzziness’ of sovereignty, contestable borders, and the probability of being subjugated by mainland entities. But they also share the potential for alternative modes of viable ‘development’. As stated above, the complexity of dealing with this environmental issue is an extremely challenging problem. Managing the ocean as a static space has failed to disrupt the incursion of everyday consumer products, such as lighters, plastic bags, soda bottles, and other flotsam and jetsam, journeying thousands of kilometers from their terrestrial locales to drift at sea and eventually sink into the depths or dissipate into increasingly smaller particulates.

The spatiality of capitalism demands that ocean space be treated as either a surface of transport or the location of exploitable resources. However, the obvious maritimity of the world’s small island states and territories demands a more comprehensive concern with, and stewardship of, the sea. The degradation of the ocean by marine debris – and noting the equally galling crisis in fish stocks worldwide - necessitates new legal, political and social understandings. Perhaps, the
‘fuzziness’ of sovereignty and juridical ambiguities may allow a chance to, as Baldacchino writes, “exploit a situation to serve [another] purpose” (p. 27), one beyond just the economic exploitation for which the Law of the Sea seems intended. Perhaps, by better aligning our aquatic imaginaries with the physical spatialities of ocean space, we can begin to envision policies that reduce trash production, prevent ocean pollution and restore the ocean’s health.

**Other Works Cited**


– Reviewed by Katherine G. Sammler, *The University of Arizona*


The teaching profession has been the subject of perpetual scrutiny for several reasons, but one of the most prevalent criticisms is that educators’ practices are not supported by standards. It is true that most professions have a set of norms regarding conduct for their members. Teachers also have sets of standards, but they are usually more relevant to the actual training of instructors or the way in which the curriculum is to be taught. The natural concern for having a benchmark by which professional conduct is evaluated is that school environments can vary so wildly within even a single district that these standards may be rendered irrelevant depending upon the circumstances. With this problem in mind, Charlotte Danielson does an admirable job of outlining the standard of conduct to which educators should strive to adhere in *Enhancing Professional Practice: A Framework for Teaching*.

Danielson’s aim is elegant in its simplicity: create a framework which supports new teachers while enhancing the abilities of veteran teachers by giving them a common language to communicate